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ABSTRACT
Matching demand and supply is recognized as a crucial issue for
smart grids, and ICT-based solutions are essential to deliver the in-
frastructure, algorithms and mechanisms for demand-supply balanc-
ing. To date, most work in this area focus on providing users with
real time feedback on energy prices and consumption, or on load
scheduling of home appliances for individual user consumption. In
this paper, we take a complementary approach by exploiting social
relationships among consumers to organise them into coalitions of
Virtual Electricity Consumers (VECs) that buy electricity as a single
customer in order to get a discount on electricity through collective
buying. Speciﬁcally, we model our problem as a coalitional game
and provide an algorithm, based on linear programming, to form
VECs. The VECs formed by our algorithm are both efﬁcient (i.e.,
minimizing the sum of users’ payments) and stable (i.e., no user has
any incentive to break away). We empirically analyse our approach
using real consumption data for a set of households located in UK.
Our analysis provides interesting insights into the relationship be-
tween structure and stability of VEC’s and prices within the electric-
ity market.
Index Terms— Coalition formation, virtual electricity
consumer, collective buying, demand-side management
1. INTRODUCTION
Balancing demand and supply is a crucial issue for the elec-
tricity grid currently achieved by varying the supply-side
to continuously match demand. Demand is typically met
through a combination of base-load stations which are cheap
but slow to vary, and more expensive peaking-plants whose
outputs can readily change to follow changing demand. Al-
though only running at peak time when there is high demand,
these generators are responsible for a signiﬁcant part of con-
sumers electricity bill.
In this perspective, the vision of the Smart Grid includes
demand-side peak-shaving strategies such as real-time pric-
ing or proﬁle’s based tariffs to encourage consumption that
ﬂattens demand [1]. A ﬂattened demand results in a more efﬁ-
cient grid not only with lower carbon emissions but also with
lower prices for customers. ICT-based solutions are needed
for the implementation of these demand side programmes in
order to help consumers to buy energy in the changing mar-
kets and reduce their energy bills. Hence, several works fo-
cus on developing IT infrastructures that provide direct real
time information to consumers about tariffs, consumption and
load [2].
However, while promising, when each consumer indepen-
dently optimizes its own consumption, the effectiveness of
these solutions has a clear limit on the consumer’s restrictions
and comfort (e.g. a consumption peak in the non-working
hours of consumers is very likely to occur). More interest-
ingly, recently a number of organizations, such as the Big
Switch1 in the UK, have captured a lot of attention by bring-
ing consumers together in order to get a discount on electric-
ity through collective buying (i.e. by encoring customers to
harness the power of group buying).
Similarly, in this paper, we focus on the formation of
coalitionsamongelectricityconsumerswithnear-complementary
consumption restrictions. We then assume that a coalition of
consumers acts in the market as a single virtual electricity
consumer (VEC) with a ﬂattened demand proﬁle for which
it can negotiate better prices. This reduced price is related to
the composition of electricity market that, in most European
countries includes at least two different kinds of markets: the
spot and the forward electricity markets [3]. The spot mar-
kets trade short-term electricity deliveries, and typically each
time slot may have a different unit price for electricity (e.g.,
in Italy the day-ahead market is a spot market where hourly
blocks of electricity are negotiated for the next day [4]). In
contrast, forward markets trade electricity contracts for long
periods (e.g. month, quarter or year) with delivery and with-
drawal obligations. Thus, the contract in a forward market
speciﬁes a single quantity that will be delivered at constant
rate for the contract period and a single price. Customers
can beneﬁt from lower rates in the forward markets but to
participate they must be sure to use all the energy they buy.
Therefore a ﬂat coalitional proﬁle allows customers to buy
more on the forward market and consequently obtain higher
gains. On the other hand, if customers buy more energy on
1https://www.whichbigswitch.co.uk/the forward market suppliers can have a better estimate of
future electricity demand and thus they can better optimize
production.
Thus, against this background, in this paper we propose
a game-theoretical model for VEC formation that ﬁnds the
most efﬁcient VECs to form (i.e., the VECs that minimize the
sum of payments). Furthermore we show how to split total
payment among its members so that the VECs are stable (i.e.,
no user or group of users has any incentive to leave and form
on other VECs). Our solution is based on modelling the elec-
tricity consumer coalition formation problem as a coalitional
game [5], where: (i) the set of coalitions with maximum col-
lective value (i.e., an optimal coalition structure), has to be
identiﬁed; and (ii) each coalition’s value has to be distributed
amongitsmembersinsuchawaythatcoalitionmembershave
no incentive to break away from the identiﬁed optimal struc-
ture. Moreover, we restrict the coalition membership using
the individual customers’ acquaintances in a social network
to provide some form of trust among coalition members.
Thus, in more detail, this paper makes the following con-
tributions:
• We formally deﬁne the concept of VEC along with a
metric that, given an estimation of the aggregated coali-
tion consumption, computes the total payment by opti-
mizing the buying strategy within the electricity mar-
kets.
• We propose an algorithm that allows consumers in a
social network to generate and evaluate the network-
feasible electricity coalitions.
• We use linear programming approaches to identify the
most efﬁcient VEC’s and to subsequently allocate core-
stable payments to individual consumers (if the core is
not empty). When such core-stable allocation exists the
total payment of each VEC is split among its mem-
bers such that the formed VECs are stable (i.e. con-
sumers can not be better off leaving their current VEC
and forming a new one).
• We evaluated our model on a real dataset based on the
electricity consumption of households in the UK. The
results are analyzed in terms of the structure and sta-
bility of the formed coalitions as well as in terms of
the gain obtained by consumers as a result of engaging
in the coalition formation process. Results show that
stability of the most efﬁcient VECs is signiﬁcantly af-
fected by the density of the social network. Moreover,
the structure of the formed VECs is highly dependent
on the difference between market prices; close prices
between forward and spot market do not encourage the
formation of coalitions, whereas, as this difference in-
creases, larger coalitions appear (until after some limit
parameter value the grand coalition always emerges).
Fig. 1. A sample of a hourly load electricity proﬁle and the
different quantities to buy in the forward market given differ-
ent forward over spot market prices ratios.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we de-
scribe our model for coalition formation among electricity
consumers as a coalitional game. Section 3 presents our em-
pirical evaluation, and Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. THE MODEL
In this section, we model the problem of group formation
among electricity consumers as a coalitional game. Let A =
f1;:::;ng be the set of electricity consumers ids, each one
with its associated electricity proﬁle. Figure 1 shows an ex-
ample of an electricity proﬁle as a graph that plots the varia-
tion in the electrical load (measured in kW) versus time (mea-
sured in hours). Formally, we deﬁne the electricity proﬁle of
a consumer i as a vector ei = fe1
i;:::;eN
i g where et
i is the
amount of electricity consumed at time slot t.
Consumers can form electricity coalitions S  A, where
an electricity coalition S stands for the set of consumers S
acting as a VEC in the market along with their joint consump-
tion. We refer to the coalition composed of all consumers as
grand coalition and to the coalition composed by a single in-
dividual consumer as singleton coalition. Then, the coalition
formation process involves three differentiated activities: (1)
determining which coalitions can be formed and the metric to
evaluate them (Coalitional Value Calculation); (2) ﬁnding a
coalition structure2 with maximal value (Coalition Structure
Generation); and (3) dividing the payments generated by the
total consumption of their electrical coalitions (Payoff Distri-
bution). Next, we specify how we solve the three main ac-
tivities that underline the coalition formation process for this
particular domain.
2.1. Coalitional Value Calculation
In this section we formalize the coalitional value calculation,
namely the generation and evaluation of coalitions, for the
VEC formation. In particular, we propose that consumers
use social networks to support the formation and restriction
of electricity coalitions.
2A coalition structure refers to a partition of the space of consumers into
coalitions.Coalition Evaluation. The ﬁrst issue that arise in this context
is how consumers evaluate the potential of a VEC. To this end
we deﬁne a metric to evaluate coalitions by computing the to-
tal payment that coalition of consumers S will incur for their
aggregated demand. We represent the (expected) demand of
any coalition of consumers S by their joint average electricity
proﬁle eS = fe1
S;:::;eN
S g where et
S =
P
i2S et
i.
Now we propose a metric that optimises the buying strat-
egy across the forward and the spot markets taken to meet
the expected VEC aggregate consumption. Let pF be the unit
electricity price in the forward market and pS the average unit
electricity price among daily hours in the spot market 3. The
value of the expected payment for the coalition S is given by:
v(S) =
N X
t=1
q
t
S(S)  pS + N  qF(S)  pF + (S) (1)
where qF(S) stands for the time unit amount of electricity to
buy in the forward market and qt
S(S) for the amount to buy in
the spot market at time slot t such that satisfy:
q
t
S(S) + qF(S)  e
t
S 8t = 1:::n (2)
and where (S) stands for a coalition management constant,
a constant that depends on the size of the coalition and cap-
tures the intuition that larger coalitions are harder to manage
so in case of equal value consumers prefer smaller ones. In
particular, through this paper, we set this constant as (S) =
(jSj   1)  (maxt=1:::n qt
S(S)   qF(S))=jA(G)j.
Hence, to compute the value of a coalition in this domain
consumers need to determine the forward and time-slot spot
quantitiessuchthatEquation1ismaximised(i.e. thepayment
regarding their joint consumption is minimized) whereas sat-
isfying constraints in Equation 2 that guarantee that these
quantities meet the coalition electricity demand. Algorithm
1 describe a procedure that allows agents to solve the above-
deﬁned optimization problem.
ALGORITHM 1. Given as input the coalition electricity
proﬁle, eS, and the ratio between prices among the two avail-
able markets,
pF
pS the algorithm returns qF(S) and for each
time slot t qt
S(S).
1(a): Sort the coalition proﬁle values eS in descending or-
der.
1(b): Set qF(S) to the value at position pF=pS  N of the
proﬁle (that is the amount of energy covered at least
pF
pS of
the time interval).
1(c): For each time slot t = 1::::N compute the spot
quantity for a time slot t as the amount of demanded elec-
tricity that exceeds the forward quantity, that is qt
S(S) =
max(et
S   qF(S);0);
Intuitively, in order for consumers in a coalition to be advan-
tageous to buy a certain continuous electricity amount qF for
3Prices are negative values to denote the direction of payment
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Fig. 2. Example of (a) a consumer network (G); (b) a pseu-
dotree PT of G; and (c) the set of G-restricted coalitions par-
titioned in leading coalitions per consumers.
all the period in the forward market, this continuous amount
should be used at least
pF
pS of the time interval. Figure 1 shows
how different market ratios lead to different buying strate-
gies within electricity markets for the same coalition proﬁle.
Horizontal lines stand for different quantities to be bought
in the forward market given the market ratios as labeled at
the end of the line. Observe that in the particular case when
there is no economical incentive to buy in the forward market
(pF = pS), theforwardquantityrepresentsthesaferbaseload
corresponding to the minimum among the hourly expected
consumption (in Figure 1 the consumption at time slot 3). No-
tice that as the
pF
pS ratio decreases, VECs increase the quantity
bought in the forward market, in detriment of this bought in
the spot, buying larger continuous amounts even when they
are not expect to used it all hours of the day. Thus, in Figure
1 if the ratio between markets is one half the amount to buy
in the forward market is exactly the value of the 12th measure
in magnitude (corresponding to time slot 4).
Once provided a metric that allows consumers to evaluate
electricity coalitions, the second issue that consumers need
to address is to decide which coalitions consider and how to
enumerate them.
Coalition enumeration. We consider that each consumer
looks for potential partners for its coalitions through its con-
tacts in a social network. In this way, coalition membership
is restricted to coalitions composed of friends of friends,
being always somebody in the coalition responsible for the
introduction of a new member. From the game perspective
this implies that feasible coalitions are restricted by a graph:
(i) each node of the graph represents a consumer; and (ii)
a coalition S can be formed iff every two consumers in S
are connected by some path in the subgraph induced by S.
Let G be a connected (undirected) graph with vertex set
A(G) = f1;:::;ng and let E(G) be the set of edges among
consumers. We denote the set of feasible coalitions as F(G).
An example of a 4-consumer network that deﬁnes a graph
G is given in Figure 2 (a). Tables in Figure 2 (b) list the
set of feasible coalitions restricted by the graph in Figure 2
(a). Thus, consumer 3 can form an electricity coalition with
0 and 1 (S = f0;1;3g) but not a coalition with 1 without 0(S = f1;3g 62 F(G)).
Here, we observe that the problem of generating graph-
coalitions can be cast to the problem of enumerating all con-
nected induced subgraphs of a given graph and we use the
state-of-the-art algorithm proposed in [6] to generate all elec-
tricity coalitions in the social network. This algorithm (for
further details see [6] Section 5) (i) uses an ordering among
consumers that partitions the set of graph coalitions into dis-
joint (leading) sets fLijai 2 A(G)g, one per consumer; and
(ii) can be executed independently by each consumer i 2
A(G) to generate its set of leading coalitions Li (i.e.all graph
coalitions in which i has precedence position in the ordering
among other coalition members). Instead of using a linear or-
dering as in [6], we propose to use the partial ordering that
deﬁnes a pseudotree arrangement of the social network graph
[7]. A pseudotree PT of G is a rooted tree with consumers
A(G) as nodes and the property that any two consumers that
share an edge in G are on the same branch in PT. Figure 2(b)
shows a pseudotree, rooted at consumer 0, of the cyclic graph
G in Figure 2(a) and Figure 2(c) shows the different sets of
agents leading coalitions for the pseudotree in Figure 2(b).
2.2. Coalition Structure Generation
To solve the Coalition Structure Generation (CSG) problem,
which is known to be NP-Hard, we use an integer program-
ming (IP) approach (see [8], pages 38-39). Compared with
other state-of-the-art CSG algorithms [9, 10], this approach
has the important advantage that can restrict the search only to
any feasible set of coalitions and, in particular, to the graph-
based coalitions such as the ones we are interested in. The
CSG problem is formulated as a binary integer programming
problem containing a set of binary decision variables xS 2
f0;1g, one per feasible coalition S 2 F(G). Then, solving
the CSG amounts to solving the following IP:
max
X
S2F(G)
v(S)  xS
such that each consumer can join at most one coalition:
8ai 2 A :
X
S2F(G)jS3i
xS = 1
where having a variable xS = 1 corresponds to coalition S
being selected in the optimal coalition structure CS.
2.3. Payoff Distribution
Having described how coalitions are formed, we now focus
on how consumers in a VEC should share the payment for
their aggregated consumption. Since consumers are selﬁsh
(i.e. they are only concerned with maximizing their own pay-
offs) to guarantee stability we need to divide the payment of
each coalition among its members in such a way that con-
sumers have no incentive to deviate (i.e. there are no other
outcomes that can make them better-off). From a game the-
oretic point of view, this involves to determine core-stable
payments of the game.
Given the optimal coalition structure, we can compute the
core-stable payments or alternatively, detects its nonexistence
(i.e. the emptiness of the core) by solving a linear program
(LP) 4. Our aim is to ﬁnd a set of negative real values that
represents the consumers’ payments , one i 2  for each
consumer i 2 A(G). Finding such a stable payments then
amounts to solving the following LP:
min
X
i2A(G)
i
such that there are no deviating coalitions for these payments:
8S 2 F(G) :
X
i2S
i  v(S)
and consumers’ payments are equal or lower than 0 (i.e.
agents do not make a positive proﬁt exploiting other con-
sumers)
8i 2 A(G) : i  0
If the value of the objective function of this LP yields the
value of the optimal coalition structure then, the problem has
a non-empty core and the values in  deﬁne an allocation in
the core. Otherwise, the problem has an empty core. It should
be emphasized that the optimal coalition structure CS is a
given parameter which means that although this program can
be solved in polynomial time it needs as input the outcome of
the IP program deﬁned in Section 2.2 which is NP-Hard.
3. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
Inthissectionweprovideanempiricalevaluationofthecoali-
tion formation model introduced in Section 2. The IP and LP
problems deﬁned in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 for computing the
optimal coalition structure and the core-stable payments are
solved using an standard, off-the-shelf optimization software
(speciﬁcally CPLEX 12.3). First, we explain the details of
our experimental setup in Section 3.1. Next, we analyse our
empirical results in Section 3.2.
3.1. Empirical settings
To analyse the sensitivity of the coalition formation process
with respect to the underlying network topology, we eval-
uate our model for two different network models, namely
random and scale free networks5. Moreover, each network
model is tested on three different link densities6: d = 1 (low),
d = 2 (medium) and d = 3 (high). Notice that scale free
4Linear programs can be solved in polynomial time in the number of vari-
ables and constraints.
5Results obtained in small-networks are omitted for the sake of space due
to their similarity to those obtained in scale free networks.
6the density of a graph is deﬁned as the ratio between the number of links
and the number of agents in the graph (
jEj
jAj)Market (e/KWh) M1 M2 M3
pF 70 60 40
pS 80 80 80
Table 1. Different market conditions tested in experiments.
networks are known to capture some characteristics of so-
cial networks [11], while random networks constitute a more
synthetic model for our domain. For each instance, the elec-
tricity proﬁle of each consumer is randomly selected from a
real dataset composed of monthly average electricity proﬁles7
characterizing the real domestic electricity consumption of
5000 households in the UK. All experiments are run using
networks of 20 consumers.
Finally, as described in Section 2, the value of a coalition in
our model depends on the two market prices, the price of the
electricity in the forward and the spot market, we evaluated
our model under three market conditions detailed in Table 1.
MarketM1usesrealpricesoftheforwardandday-aheadmar-
ket (that forms part of the spot electricity markets) in Italy [4]
whereas M2 and M3 explore scenarios in which buying in the
forward market is more beneﬁcial.
3.2. Results
We evaluate our model by performing 50 simulations for each
conﬁguration detailed above. The next sections provide an
analysis of our results in terms of consumers social gain and
the stability and structure of the formed coalitions.
3.2.1. Consumers social gain
In this section we analyse the consumers’ effective gain ob-
tained by adopting the coalitional approach proposed with re-
spect to the non-coalitional one, composed of singleton coali-
tions. Let v(CS) be the total payment of agents in the ﬁnal
coalitions and v(fig) the payment of the agent in its single-
ton coalition. Then, the average percent gain is assessed as
v(CS
) 
P
ai2A v(fig)
P
ai2A v(fig) . Table 2 shows the average percent gain
for 20 consumers on a random and scalefree networks in the
three different market scenarios respectively.
Results show that in all conﬁgurations the coalitional per-
cent gain increment with density (more links among agents
lead to more feasible electricity coalitions among them) is
not signiﬁcant. Regarding different market conditions, as ex-
pected, the average percent coalitional gain is directly propor-
tional to the economical incentive to enroll the forward mar-
ket: around 0:5-0:6% in M1, 1:1-1:4% in M2 and 6:6-7:2%
in M3.
3.2.2. Economical stability of electricity coalitions
As argued in Section 2, core-stable payments prevent self-
ish consumers to continually moving from coalition to coali-
tions leading to unstable coalition structures with possibly
7Each consumer has been monitored during December 2009, recording
the power consumption every half an hour, for a total of 48 daily time slots.
Topology Density
% Average Gain % Empty Core
M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Random
Low 0:5 1:1 6:6 0 2 0
Medium 0:5 1:3 7:2 48 31 58
High 0:6 1:3 7:1 54 48 59
ScaleFree
Low 0:6 1:4 7:2 0 0 0
Medium 0:6 1:4 7 50 40 52
High 0:6 1:4 7:2 64 60 52
Table 2. Average coalitional gain and percentage of instances
with empty core under different conﬁgurations.
less social value (i.e. the sum of payments across VECs is
greater than in the optimal). Table 2 shows the percentage of
instances for each conﬁguration for which the core was de-
tected as empty (i.e. core-stability does not exist). Notice
that in all network topologies, the number of instances for
which the core is empty increases with the density of the net-
work. Observe that for low density networks most instances
create core-stable coalitions (98%   100%). These results
are coherent with the well-known results that any acyclic net-
work (which has by deﬁnition the lowest density) is guaran-
tee to have a non-empty core [12]. As we increase the density
the number of cycles also increases and results show that the
probability of core emptiness is higher (i.e. a higher num-
ber of instances have no stable economical agreement among
consumers). Thus, for example, in high density networks
more than one half of instances resulted in non-stable coali-
tions.
3.2.3. Structure of electricity coalitions
In this section we analyse the structure of the electricity coali-
tions obtained in the experiments. For each conﬁguration we
plot the median of the minimum and maximum size of coali-
tions formed as well as the median of the number of coalitions
in the optimal coalition structure. Figure 3 plots the results
for networks of 20 consumers for random and scale free net-
works in the three explored market scenarios. We also plot
the standard error of the mean as a measure of the variance
in each graph. We observe that for markets M1 and M2, the
median number of coalitions of the optimal coalition struc-
ture varies from around 3 to 6 coalitions for 20 agents under
all conﬁgurations. Thus, market conditions M1 and M2 lead
to coalitions of middle size in all network structures. In con-
trast, market scenario M3 leads to much larger coalitions in
all conﬁgurations, and concretely for low and medium densi-
ties the gran coalition is often formed. Therefore, our results
show that larger differences between prices in the two mar-
kets leads to larger coalition sizes and that the structure of the
coalitions formed is very sensitive to these market conditions.
Finally, observe that as we increase the density of the net-
work, more coalitions of middle size are formed since the size
of the maximum coalition decreases with increasing density
(e.g. in M1 goes from around a maximum size of 17 to 9)
whereas the number of formed coalitions increases (e.g. in
M1 goes from around 3 to 6 coalitions). In contrast, low den-(b) Random Graphs M1. (c) Scale Free M1.
(d) Random Graphs M2. (e) Scale Free M2.
(f) Random Graphs M3. (g) Scale Free M3.
Fig. 3. Graphs showing the minimum/maximum size and
number sof coalitions formed on different topologies under
market conditions M1 (a)-(b), M2 (c)-(d) and M3 (e)-(f).
sity networks tend to lead to larger coalitions. This trend is
observed for all tested market conditions.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work we propose a novel energy group buying strat-
egy promoting the formation of customers’ coalitions (called
Virtual Electricity Consumers or VEC) that can buy energy
as aggregates. We model the VEC formation process as a
coalitional game using social networking as a tool for con-
sumers to provide member engagement and trust. Moreover,
we provide an algorithm (based on linear programming tech-
niques) that identiﬁes the most efﬁcient VEC’s and allocates
payments to individual members so that formed VECs are sta-
ble (i.e., no customer has any incentive to break away). Fi-
nally, we deﬁned a metric to evaluate coalitions that takes into
account customers’ cost for electricity and tested our model
on a real dataset of customers’ demand, varying crucial pa-
rameters such as topology and density of the social network
as well as market conditions.
Results show that: i) the density of the social network
affects the stability of the economical agreement among con-
sumers and in dense networks such stability often does not
exist; ii) the difference between the price of electricity in the
forward and day-ahead markets results in higher consumer
gains. Thissuggeststhatthedifferencebetweentheelectricity
price in the forward and day-ahead markets can be an effec-
tive parameter to encourage the formation of bigger coalitions
that can buy more electrical energy on the forward market re-
sulting in a more predictable demand for the whole system.
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